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The title is a reference to two famous Age of Enlightenment intellectuals: Marquis de Condorcet
(1743–94) and Thomas Malthus (1766–1834). Condorcet’s seminal work, Idea of Progress,
formed a fundamental piece of Enlightenment thought, and in it he viewed society as perfectible,
at least in principle. See Jean-Antione-Nicolas de Caritat Condorcet, OUTLINES OF AN HISTORICAL
VIEW OF THE PROGRESS OF THE HUMAN MIND (1796). Contrarily, Malthus viewed society as
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America's fundamental law seeks to make real the brotherhood of man.2
I. PREFACE
In education, race-based admissions criterion is part of a larger
governmental initiative colloquially known as “affirmative action.”3 The term
“affirmative action” derives from an Executive Order of President John F.
Kennedy instructing the “Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity . . .
immediately to scrutinize and study employment practices of the Government of
the United States, and to consider and recommend additional affirmative steps
which should be taken . . . to realize more fully the national policy of
nondiscrimination.”4 Discrimination generally refers to “[t]he effect of a law . . .
that denies privileges to a certain class because of race, age, sex, nationality,
religion, or disability.”5 A plain reading of this definition indicates that
nondiscrimination is race-neutral and universally applicable.
Less than twenty years after President Kennedy’s noble nondiscrimination
proclamation, the Supreme Court of the United States preserved a University of
California admissions program aimed at increasing the enrollment of certain
students on the basis of their race.6 The assumed corollary of certain students
being admitted because of their race is that other students would be denied

2

Justice Louis Brandeis, Speech to the Conference of Eastern Council of Reform Rabbis (Apr. 25,
1915).
3

At this point it should be noted that this Article’s focus is racial affirmative action. Affirmative
action includes not only programs designed to address racial discrimination, but also gender
discrimination. For further discussion of gender-based affirmative action programs, see Jason M.
Skaggs, Justifying Gender-Based Affirmative Action Under United States v. Virginia’s
“Exceedingly Persuasive Justification Standard, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 1169 (1998) (addressing the
differences between race and gender-based affirmative action programs); Rosalie Berger
Levinson, Gender-Based Affirmative Action and Reverse Gender Bias: Beyond Gratz, Parents
Involved, and Ricci, 34 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 1 (2011) (same).
4

Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1,977 (Mar. 6, 1961) (emphasis added).

5

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 534 (9th ed. 2009).

6

See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Although the Court affirmed the
school’s use of a race-conscious program, it also held that such program must provide an
individualized review of each applicant’s file. See id. at 317.
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admission on the basis of their race, i.e., suffer from “reverse discrimination.”7
And so continues the national debate regarding the constitutional permissibility of
programs designed to achieve racial diversity in education, and programs whose
fate will likely be determined by one of two unlikely candidates: another
Kennedy—Justice Anthony Kennedy—or the Court’s newest member, Justice
Elena Kagan.8
II. INTRODUCTION
Affirmative action refers to “[a] set of actions designed to eliminate
existing and continuing discrimination, to remedy lingering effects of past
discrimination, and to create systems and procedures to prevent future
discrimination.”9 There have traditionally been three primary focuses of
affirmative action programs: employment, public contracting, and education, the
latter of which is the focus of this Article.10
With the Court’s landmark decision in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke,11 affirmative action in the context of higher education burst
onto the legal scene amidst a time when both the federal and states’ governments
7

The earliest reference to the term “reverse discrimination” appears in Quarles v. Phillip Morris,
Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968). In Quarles, the court discussed the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and stated that “[t]he history [of the Act] leads the court to conclude that Congress did not
intend to require reverse discrimination.” Id. at 516 (internal quotation marks omitted). The term
had gained sufficient legal significance by 1974, when John Hart Ely, one of the most widely-cited
legal scholars in United States history, wrote that “We would not allow a state university to favor
applicants because they are White . . . whether it [sic] called the adjustment quota, affirmative
action, or anything else. To allow [AAE programs] to favor applicants because they are Black
seems to be countenancing the most flagrant of double standards.” John Hart Ely, The
Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 723 (1974).
8

See infra Part VI (C–D).

9

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 68 (9th ed. 2009).

10

For further information on affirmative action, see Mark R. Killenbeck, Pushing Things Up To
Their First Principles: Reflections on the Values of Affirmative Action, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1299
(1999) (general discussion of affirmative action); Cynthia L. Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work:
Diversity, Integration, and Affirmative Action in the Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1
(2005) (discussing affirmative action in employment).
11

438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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were initiating broad affirmative action programs. Although various bases for
such programs have been asserted in the thirty-four years since Bakke, the
traditional and most common justification is that diversity in higher education is a
compelling state interest.12
Part III will examine the historical and legal underpinnings of affirmative
action in education (“AAE”) programs, as well as the specific legislative and
executive history, which has ultimately led to the Court’s upcoming consideration
of AAE in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (“Fisher V”).13 Part III will also
explore Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding AAE programs. This survey will
begin with Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,14 generally accepted
as the first major AAE decision, then unpack two landmark AAE cases against the
University of Michigan decided on the same day ⎯ Gratz v. Bollinger15 and
Grutter v. Bollinger.16 Finally, Part III will examine and analyze the Court’s
voluminous and controversial decision in Parents Involved in Community Schools
v. Seattle School District No. 1.17
Ultimately, the Court concluded from this line of cases that AAE
programs are not per se constitutionally defective.18 Rather, the Court reasoned
12

See Goodwin Liu, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: The Diversity Rationale and the
Compelling Interest Test, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 381 (1998) (discussing affirmative action
policies in secondary education).
13

631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 2012 WL 538328 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012) (No. 11345).
14

438 U.S. 265 (1979).

15

539 U.S. 244 (2003).

16

539 U.S. 306 (2003).

17

551 U.S. 701 (2007). It should be noted that Parents Involved does not address AAE in the
context of secondary education, but rather the focus of the case is a primary education AAE
program.
18

See, e.g., id. at 720 (holding that for an AAE program to be valid, “the use of individual racial
classifications . . . [must be] “narrowly tailored” to achieve a “compelling” government interest);
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 307 (same); Gratz, 539 U.S. at 246 (holding that if an AAE program is not
narrowly tailored, it violates the Equal Protection Clause); Bakke; 438 U.S. at 319–320 (1979)
(holding that race can be taken into account, but its consideration must be part of a full
individualized review).
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that the appropriate standard of review is “strict scrutiny”19 for AAE programs
based on a “suspect” classification such as race.20 To pass constitutional muster
under strict scrutiny, AAE programs must be narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling governmental interest.21
Part IV will synthesize relevant Supreme Court precedent into a workable
set of rules with which to analyze the constitutional issues presented by AAE
programs. Part V will provide an overview of the factual and procedural
background of Fisher V,22 specifically the Fifth Circuit’s determination that the
University of Texas’ admissions policies, to the extent that an applicant’s race is
considered, are violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.23 The United States
Supreme Court granted the University of Texas’ petition for a writ of certiorari on
February 21, 2012,24 and heard oral arguments on October 10, 2012.
Part VI will evaluate available jurisprudence to estimate the Supreme
Court’s likely ruling in Fisher V, including an assessment of which Justices will
vote to reverse Fisher III25 and which will vote to go further and overrule Grutter.
Next, Part VI will shed special light on the likely votes of the Court’s two newest
19

See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505–06 (2005) (holding that, if the government
distributes burdens or benefits on the basis of individual racial classifications, the action is
reviewed under strict scrutiny); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (holding that all racial classifications
made by the government are reviewed under strict scrutiny); Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995) (holding that “all racial classifications reviewable under the Equal
Protection Clause must be strictly scrutinized”).
20

See generally Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding that all legal
restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect).
21

See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 (holding that “all racial classifications, . . . are constitutional only
if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests).
22

Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (“Fisher III”), 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132
S. Ct. 1536 (mem.) (2012).
23

Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (“Fisher IV”), 644 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (per
curiam), aff’g 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011).
24
25

132 S.Ct 1536 (mem.) (2012).

For clarity and ease of reference, the individual cases involved in Fisher will be referenced as
follows: the District Court’s denial of plaintiff’s preliminary injunction (Fisher I); the District
Court’s ruling (Fisher II); the Fifth Circuit’s ruling (Fisher III); the Fifth Circuit’s denial of
rehearing en banc (Fisher IV), and; the Supreme Court’s pending adjudication (Fisher V).
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members, neither of which have yet heard an AAE case as members of the Court,
and analyze the various ways Justice Kennedy might affect the case’s
adjudication.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
The idea of equality in education is not a 20th century invention, but is
merely one point in the continuum of our nation’s advancement toward a just and
fair society. Any thoughtful analysis of the constitutional issues surrounding AAE
programs must be based upon a thorough understanding of the subject’s history.
That history shows that the constitutionality of programs which seek to promote
racial diversity, whether it be diversity in government contracting, public sector
employment, or education, has been questioned since their inception, regardless
of how noble their proponents may believe them to be.
A. Origins: The Roosevelt Era
In the mid-20th century, the legislative and executive branches of the
United States government recognized that the federal government’s budgetary
power could be used as a tool to aid in eliminating racial discrimination. Although
reasonable minds may disagree on when the genesis of AAE programs occurred,
it is fair to say that the roots of the federal government’s modern antidiscrimination policies date at least as far back as President Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s administration, during which the first executive orders prohibiting
discrimination in federal contract procurement were issued.26 In 1941, President
Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802 whose stated purpose was to “encourage
full participation in the national defense program by all citizens . . . regardless of
race, creed, color, or national origin” because the only way the country could be
defended was with “the help and support of all groups within its borders.”27
Accordingly, Roosevelt ordered that “[a]ll contracting agencies of the
Government of the United States shall include in all defense contracts hereafter
negotiated by them a provision obligating the contractor not to discriminate

26

Exec. Order No. 8,802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3,109 (June 25, 1941).

27

Id.
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against any worker because of race, creed, color, or national origin.”28 Notably,
however, Roosevelt issued the Order because of the compelling governmental
interest in preparing the nation for war with Germany and Japan, not for the
altruistic reasons of later affirmative action legislation. The Order merely
prohibited contemporaneous and future discrimination; it did not have an eye
towards any past societal, individual, or industry-specific discrimination, all three
of which became future justifications for race-based legislation.
B. Expansion: The Johnson Era
Affirmative action aims to produce a society free of discrimination.
Perhaps the greatest advancements toward that aim were made during Lyndon
Johnson’s administration. During his presidency, Johnson constantly pushed for
enhanced civil rights protections. The Johnson administration’s most significant
accomplishment in the anti-discrimination arena was the promulgation of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.29 Included in the Act’s massive and groundbreaking
legislation, and of significant importance to AAE programs, was Title VI.30
Title VI, enacted to prevent discrimination by agencies that receive federal
funding, states that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.” 31 Among the programs receiving funding from the
federal Department of Education are “[all] state education agencies . . . [and]
3,200 colleges and universities.”32
Johnson made another pioneering move when he issued the “Equal
Employment Opportunity” Order on September 24, 1965.33 Similar to Executive
Order 8802 that Roosevelt had issued in 1941, the Equal Employment
28

Id.

29

Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000 et seq. (West 2010)).

30

78 Stat. 252, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d (West 2010).

31

Id.

32

U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/hq43e4.html (last visited
Apr. 11, 2012).
33

Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (Sept. 24, 1965).
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Opportunity Order reinforced several of the federal government’s alreadyestablished anti-discrimination policies, including a prohibition on discrimination
in governmental employment, a prohibition on discrimination in employment by
government contractors and subcontractors, and nondiscrimination provisions in
federally assisted construction contracts.34
In the wake of the 1960s civil rights legislation, the late 1970s and early
1980s became a period during which the nation’s judiciary grappled with the
constitutional implications of affirmative action programs.35 One of the many
issues courts struggled with, aside from general treatment of affirmative action
programs, was how to deal specifically with AAE programs, which had been
implemented ostensibly to ensure institutional compliance with federal
nondiscrimination laws.
C. Interpretation: The Landmark Education Cases
One might consider the decisions in a plethora of cases regarding AAE
programs to be “landmark.”36 By the late 1970s, flaws in affirmative action
policies began to appear in greater numbers and the term “reverse discrimination”
had begun to come into common parlance.37 In 1978, the Supreme Court
addressed the issue head on in Bakke, ruling that race may be considered in a
“holistic review” of an applicant’s file.38 After Bakke, there was relative calm
regarding AAE programs for twenty-five years. Then, in 2003, the Supreme Court
34

Id.

35

See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (holding the University of California’s race-conscious
admissions policy unconstitutional); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (holding that
Congress could use its power under the Spending Clause to remedy past discrimination).
36

To provide a concise history on the subject, this Part has narrowed the field to only Supreme
Court decisions, which have played an extraordinary role in the evolution of AAE policy. There
are a huge number of lower federal court cases involving AAE programs, and the positions
adopted are varied. Compare Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), abrogated by
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (holding that admissions programs which discriminate
in favor of minority applicants by giving substantial racial preferences violate equal protection),
with Brewer v. West Irondequiot Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that
reducing racial isolation and de facto segregation justify AAE programs).
37

See supra note 7.

38

Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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decided two cases, Gratz v. Bollinger39 and Grutter v. Bollinger,40 which
reinforced Bakke. Most recently, however, in Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, the Court prohibited assigning students to
public schools solely for the purpose of achieving racial integration and declined
to recognize racial balancing as a compelling state interest.41 This Part will
address each of the aforementioned cases in turn, with the hope of building a
logical framework with which to predict the Court’s forthcoming decision in
Fisher V.42
1. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke
In Bakke, the Court addressed the specific issue of whether the University
of California at Davis’ admissions policy that set forth an implicit racial quota
was constitutional. Beginning in the early 1970s, “[t]he Medical School of the
University of California at Davis [(“Davis”)] had two admissions programs for
the entering class of 100 students—the [‘]regular[ʼ] admissions program and the
[‘]special[ʼ] admissions program.”43 Out of the one hundred available slots,
sixteen were reserved for applicants selected via the “special” admissions
program.44 The 1973 and 1974 application forms allowed applicants to request
consideration as “economically and/or educationally disadvantaged” and as
members of a “minority group.”45 None, of the many non-minority students who
requested consideration because of an economic or educational disadvantage were
accepted under the “special” program, however.46

39

539 U.S. 244 (2003).

40

539 U.S. 306 (2003).

41

See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 702–04 (2007).

42

631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 2012 WL 538328 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012) (No. 11345).
43

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265.

44

Id.

45

Id.

46

Id. at 266.
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Allan Bakke, a Caucasian male applicant, applied to Davis in both 1973
and 1974 under the “general” admissions program and was rejected both times.47
In both years, “special” applicants “with significantly lower scores than
[Bakke’s]” were accepted.48 After his second rejection, Bakke sought a court
order compelling his admission to Davis.49 Bakke claimed that:
[T]he special admissions program operated to exclude him on the
basis of his race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment . . . and § 601 of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which provides, inter alia, that no person shall
on the ground of race or color be excluded from participating in
any program receiving federal financial assistance.50
“The trial court found that the [‘]special[ʼ] program operated as a racial
quota” and violated both the United States Constitution and Title VI; as such it
declared Davis “could not take race into account when making admissions
decisions.”51 The court did not, however, compel Bakke’s admission due to
insufficient evidence “that he would have been admitted but for the [‘]special[ʼ]
47

See id.

48

Id. Although the author finds no correlation, some opponents of Davis’ AAE program have
pointed to the tale of Patrick Chavis as the epilogue to Bakke. Chavis, who was one of the
“special” applicants admitted over Bakke, became an obstetrician-gynecologist. In a 1995 article
promoting AAE programs, the New York Times portrayed Chavis as “an example of the [kind of]
good [an AAE program] does.” Nicholas Lemann, Taking Affirmative Action Apart, N.Y. TIMES,
June 11, 1995, at 36. In the same article, Bakke was described as a doctor who “has no private
practice and works on an interim basis” and has not “set the world on fire as a doctor.” Id.
Moreover, in 1997, Chavis himself said, “We need to go back and do a comparison of what
[students admitted under the “special” program] are doing now compared to [Bakke].” Kenneth
Lloyd Billingsley, Affirmative Action in Action, FRONTPAGE MAGAZINE, Sept. 1, 1997,
http://archive.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=22235. However, Chavis’ medical
license was revoked less than a year later due to his “inability to perform even the most basic
duties required of a physician.” Id. This inability resulted in a patient’s death, one of more than
ninety counts against him. Douglas Martin, Patrick Chavis, 50, Affirmative Action Figure, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 15, 2002, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/15/us/patrick-chavis-50affirmative-action-figure.html.
49

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 266.

50

Id.

51

Id. The trial court also found the program violative of the California Constitution.
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program.”52 On appeal, the California Supreme Court, applied strict scrutiny,53
and affirmed the trial court’s decision that Davis’ “special” program violated the
federal Constitution.54
In its decision, the United States Supreme Court produced a fractured 5-4
opinion—including two pluralities55—delivered by Justice Powell.56 The Court
reversed the California Supreme Court’s decision “insofar as it prohibits
petitioner from taking race into account as a factor in its future admissions
decisions.”57 The Court concluded that excluding a candidate from consideration
solely on the basis of race was unconstitutional, no matter what the purpose.58
Moreover, because Davis could not prove that even without the “special”
admissions program Bakke would not have been admitted, Bakke’s admission
was compelled.59 However, the Court stated that “[e]thnic diversity, . . . is only
one element in a range of factors a university properly may consider in attaining
the goal of a heterogeneous student body.”60 The Court further stated that
52

Id.

53

Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal.3d 34, 49 (Cal. 1976) aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
438 U.S. 265 (1978). Clearly explaining the standard to be applied, the Supreme Court of
California stated,
Classification by race is subject to strict scrutiny, at least where the
classification results in detriment to a person because of his race. In the case of
such a racial classification, not only must the purpose of the classification serve
a ‘compelling state interest,’ but it must be demonstrated by rigid scrutiny that
there are no reasonably ways to achieve the state's goals by means which impose
a lesser limitation on the rights of the group disadvantaged by the classification.
Id.
54

Id. at 38.

55

One plurality was comprised of Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, and the other
plurality was comprised of Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stevens, Stewart and Rehnquist.
Additionally, Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun all filed separate opinions.
56

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 267-72.

57

Id. at 267.

58

Id. at 320.

59

Id.

60

Id. at 314.
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universities could use race as a “plus factor,”61 citing the Harvard College
Admissions Program as a constitutionally valid program which took into account
all of an applicant’s qualities during a “holistic review.”62
In a plurality opinion, Justice Brennan concluded that Davis’ “special”
program was in fact constitutional and that the California Supreme Court’s
decision warranted reversal in full.63 Brennan also reasoned that race could be
used as a factor when it was for the purpose of remedying extensive, prolonged
underrepresentation of certain minorities in society generally.64 Finally, Justice
Stevens’ opinion concluded that Davis’ “special” admissions program violated
Title VI because it excluded from consideration an applicant on the basis of
race.65 After Bakke, and in accordance with the Court’s position therein, many
colleges and universities adopted “holistic review” admissions policies that
included racial minority status as a “plus factor.”
2. The University of Michigan Cases
In 2003, the Supreme Court heard two cases concerning AAE programs,
both originating with the University of Michigan (“Michigan”). In Gratz v.
Bollinger, the Court, in a 6-3 decision, held that Michigan’s undergraduate AAE
program was unconstitutional because it did not adequately provide “individual[]
consideration” of each applicant.66 However, in Grutter v. Bollinger, with a
narrower 5-4 majority, the Court held that admissions policy of the University of
Michigan’s Law School (“Michigan Law”) was indeed constitutional because it
sufficiently allowed for an individual assessment of each applicant’s contributions
to class diversity.67 Gratz and Grutter are crucial to the analysis of Fisher in Part

61

Id. at 317.

62

See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316. The term “holistic review” would first be used in Grutter. See
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 309.
63

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 325–26.

64

Id. at 370–71.

65

Id. at 421.

66

539 U.S. 244, 271 (2003).

67

539 U.S. 306, 307 (2003).
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VI of this Article because five of the Court’s nine current members contributed to
those decisions.68
a. Gratz v. Bollinger
Gratz involved two petitioners, Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Hamacher, both
Caucasian residents of Michigan, who applied for admission to the University of
Michigan for the fall semesters of 1995 and 1997, respectively; Michigan denied
both petitioners admission.69 In October 1997, the petitioners filed a class action
suit which consisted of applicants who had “applied for and were not granted
admission to . . . the University of Michigan for all academic years from 1995
forward and who are members of those racial or ethnic groups, including
Caucasian, that defendants treat[ed] less favorably on the basis of race in
considering their application for admission.”70 The petitioners alleged “violations
and threatened violations . . . [of] equal protection of the laws under the
Fourteenth Amendment . . . and for racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981, 1983, and 2000d et seq.”71
Although Michigan’s undergraduate admissions policies changed several
times during the time period relevant to the Gratz litigation, as of 2003 Michigan
used a 150-point scale to rank applicants, with 100 points needed to guarantee
admission.72 Under that policy, underrepresented racial minorities automatically
received twenty points because of their racial status.73 For a comparison, if an
applicant’s artistic talent “rivaled that of Monet or Picasso, the applicant would
receive, at most, five points.”74

68

The five current members of the Court who took part in Gratz and Grutter are Justices Breyer,
Ginsburg, Kennedy, Thomas, and Scalia.
69

.Id.

70

Id. at 252–53 (internal quotation marks omitted).

71

Id. at 252 (internal quotation marks omitted).

72

Id. at 255.

73

Id. at 256.

74

Gratz, 539 U.S. at 273.
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The Court75 held that because one-fifth of the points necessary to
guarantee admission under Michigan’s admissions policy were automatically
awarded solely on the basis of the applicant’s status as an “underrepresented
minority,” the policy was “not narrowly tailored to achieve the interest in
educational diversity.”76 The Court seemed to articulate the stance that the term
“diversity” was being too narrowly defined, i.e., that Michigan implicitly
construed the term to mean only “racial” diversity instead of a broader
interpretation that encompassed a plethora of “soft variables.”77
Gratz produced three separate dissenting opinions.78 Justice Ginsburg,
joined by Justice Souter, believed that it was constitutionally permissible for
Michigan to have an admissions policy in which race was considered “to prevent
discrimination being perpetuated and to undo the effects of past discrimination.”79
An insightful dissent filed by Justice Souter and joined in part by Justice Ginsburg
observed that the argument that Michigan’s admissions policy operated as a de
facto set-aside for racial minorities “boils down to the claim that a plus factor of
20 points makes some observers suspicious, where a factor of 10 points might not.
But suspicion does not carry petitioners’ burden of persuasion in this
constitutional challenge . . . .”80 Importantly, Souter foreshadowed the issues
surrounding “percentage plans”81 that would arise nine years later in Fisher V by
stating:
In contrast to [Michigan’s] forthrightness in saying just what plus
factor it gives for membership in an underrepresented minority, it
75

The majority in Gratz was comprised of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Scalia,
Thomas, and Kennedy. Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment and also joined Justice
O’Connor’s separate concurrence.
76

See id. at 270 (emphasis added).

77

See infra p. 253 and note 87.

78

The three dissenting opinions were filed by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. Stevens
believed the petitioners lacked standing and that the case should have been dismissed. See Gratz,
539 U.S. at 291 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79

Gratz, 539 U.S. at 302 (quoting United States v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836,
876 (5th Cir. 1966)).
80

Id. at 296.

81

See discussion infra Part V(A).
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is worth considering the character of [“percentage plans”] thrown
up as preferable, because supposedly not based on race. . . . While
there is nothing unconstitutional about such a practice, it
nonetheless suffers from a serious disadvantage. It is the
disadvantage of deliberate obfuscation. The “percentage plans” are
just as race conscious as the point scheme (and fairly so), but they
get their racially diverse results without saying directly what they
are doing or why they are doing it. In contrast, Michigan states its
purpose directly and, if this were a doubtful case for me, I would
be tempted to give Michigan an extra point of its own for its
frankness. Equal protection cannot become an exercise in which
the winners are the ones who hide the ball.82
b. Grutter v. Bollinger
In the companion case to Gratz, the Court in Grutter v. Bollinger analyzed
the University of Michigan Law School’s admissions policies.83 The petitioner,
Barbara Grutter, was a Caucasian female Michigan who applied to Michigan Law
in 1996 as a Michigan resident. Despite Grutter’s excellent credentials, Michigan
Law denied her admission.84 Like the petitioners in Gratz, Grutter filed suit
alleging Michigan Law “discriminated against her on the basis of race in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat.
252, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; and Rev. Stat. § 1977, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1981.”85
At the time of the litigation, the goal of Michigan Law’s admissions policy
was to “achieve that diversity which has the potential to enrich everyone's
education and thus make a law school class stronger than the sum of its parts.”86
Michigan Law’s admissions policy ranked applicants by two different measures
⎯ “hard variables,” i.e., objective criterion such as GPA and LSAT scores, and
“soft variables,” i.e., subjective criterion such as “the enthusiasm of
82

Gratz, 539 U.S. at 297-98.

83

Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).

84

Id. at 316. Grutter had a 3.8 GPA and a 161 LSAT score. Id.

85

Id. at 317.

86

Id. at 315.
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recommenders, the quality of the undergraduate institution, the quality of the
applicant's essay, and the areas and difficulty of undergraduate course selection”
⎯ as well as the applicant’s status as a racial minority.87 Michigan Law asserted
that its admissions policies required officials “to evaluate each applicant based on
all the information available in the file, including [soft variables] and an essay
describing the ways in which the applicant will contribute to the life and diversity
of the Law School.”88
The Court89 found that Michigan Law “engages in a highly individualized,
holistic review of each applicant's file, giving serious consideration to all the ways
an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment.”90 With a
narrow majority, the Court held that “[t]he Law School's narrowly tailored use of
race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the
educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body is not prohibited by the
Equal Protection Clause, Title VI, or § 1981.”91
The majority’s decision, however, was strongly criticized by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justices Scalia and Thomas, and, perhaps most surprisingly, Justice
Kennedy, who not only concurred in Rehnquist’s dissent but also penned a
separate dissent. The Rehnquist dissent argued that Michigan Law failed to meet
its burden under the principle of strict scrutiny of establishing the necessity of its
AAE program.92 Accordingly, Rehnquist concluded that “[a]lthough the Court
recites the language of our strict scrutiny analysis, its application of that review is
unprecedented in its deference.”93 Furthermore, Rehnquist found Michigan Law’s

87

Id.

88

Id. (emphasis added).

89

The Grutter majority was comprised of Justices O’Connor, Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer.
90

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 309.

91

Id. at 307.

92

See id. at 385–86 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

93

Id. at 380.
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program fatally flawed “because it is devoid of any reasonably precise time limit
on the . . . use of race in admissions.”94
Justice Thomas, concurring in part and dissenting in part,95 regarded the
majority’s decision, “which approves of only one racial classification,” as
“confirm[ing] that further use of race in admissions remains unlawful,” a position
with which he concurred.96 Interestingly, his dissent responded directly to the
portion of the majority’s opinion which stated “[t]he Court expects that 25 years
from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the
interest approved today.”97 In contrast, Thomas believed that Michigan Law’s
“current use of race violates the Equal Protection Clause and that the Constitution
means the same thing today as it will in [25 years].”98 As further evidence of his
frustration, Thomas stated “[t]he Court will not even deign to make the Law
School try other methods, however, preferring instead to grant a 25-year license to
violate the Constitution.”99
During the intervening period between 2003 and the Court’s next major
foray into the AAE arena, two new Justices joined the Court’s ranks. On July 1,
2005, Justice O’Connor announced that she would retire “upon the nomination
and confirmation of [her] successor.”100 Subsequently, on July 19, 2005, President
Bush nominated John Roberts to fill the vacancy that would be created by
O’Connor’s retirement.101 However, six weeks later on September 3, 2005, Chief
Justice Rehnquist died. Shortly thereafter, on September 5, 2005, President Bush
94

Id. at 386. The Court had previously emphasized the durational aspect in considering the
constitutionality of race-conscious programs. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 510
(1980).
95

In reality, Thomas merely concurred with his interpretation of the majority.

96

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 350–51 (Thomas, J., concurring).

97

Id. at 310 (majority opinion).

98

Id. at 351 (Thomas, J., concurring).

99

Id. at 370.

100

Letter from Sandra Day O’Connor, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, to
George W. Bush, President of the United States (July 1, 2005), available at http://www.cspan.org/pdf/resignation_070105.pdf.
101

President George W. Bush, National Address (July 19, 2005).
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withdrew Roberts’ nomination as O’Connor’s successor and instead nominated
Roberts to fill the vacancy created by Rehnquist’s death.102 The Senate confirmed
Roberts’ nomination as Chief Justice on September 29, 2005.103 With Rehnquist’s
seat now filled, President Bush shifted his attention to filling O’Connor’s seat.104
On October 31, 2005, President Bush nominated Samuel Alito and Alito received
Senate confirmation on January 31, 2006.105
3. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1
The uncertainty of these new additions to the Court eventually gave way
to Parents Involved, a crucial case in developing a framework to analyze the
Court’s forthcoming decision in Fisher V. Parents Involved is distinguishable
from Gratz and Grutter in several ways.106 The most obvious distinction is that
Parents Involved concerned an AAE program in primary education, not at
institutions of higher education like Gratz and Grutter.107
In Parents Involved, the Seattle, Washington and Jefferson County,
Kentucky school districts “voluntarily adopted student assignment plans that
relied upon students’ races to determine which public schools certain children
may attend.”108 Both school districts considered the student’s racial

102

President George W. Bush, National Address (Sept. 5, 2005).

103

S. 10771, 109th Cong. § 69 (2005). It is interesting to note that Roberts served as Rehnquist’s
clerk from 1980–81.
104

Alito was not President Bush’s first choice. President Bush initially nominated Harriet Miers,
but Miers withdrew her nomination after facing significant opposition and out of concern
regarding potentially testifying about her service in the White House. Letter from Harriet Miers, to
George W. Bush, President of the United States (Oct. 27, 2005), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/27/AR2005102700680_pf.html.
105

S. 385, 109th Cong. § 54 (2006).

106

The decision in Parents Involved is 168 pages long. Although the author could easily write a
great deal on this case, only the most relevant themes will be addressed.
107

Compare Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701, 709–10 (2007), with Gratz, 539 U.S. 244, 250
(2003), and Grutter, 539 U.S. 306, 311–12 (2003).
108

See generally Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
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classification109 when a student was assigned to a particular school in the interests
of ensuring that “the racial balance at the school falls within a predetermined
range based on the racial composition of the district as a whole.”110 However, the
specifics of each district’s AAE programs were distinguishable in certain
important respects.
Seattle School District Number 1 (“Seattle”)111 adopted a plan in 1998 that
allowed incoming high school freshmen to choose from and rank by preference
any of the district’s high schools with each school ranked in order of that
student’s preference.112 As some schools were more popular than others, the
district employed a series of “tiebreakers” to determine which students would be
admitted into a school that had more requests than available seats.113 The first
tiebreaker gave preference to students that had a sibling enrolled at the
oversubscribed school.114
However, the next tiebreaker—the one around which the controversy
centers—depended solely on the student’s race in relation to the racial
composition of the school.115 The racial composition of public high school
students in Seattle was approximately forty percent “white” and sixty percent
“nonwhite.”116 If the oversubscribed school’s racial composition was not within
ten percentage points of the district’s overall white/nonwhite composition, the
district would identify the school as “integration positive;” once a school received
109

Id. at 710. The Seattle school district classified children as white or nonwhite and the Jefferson
County district classified children as black or “other.” Id.
110

Id.

111

The Court took note of the fact that Seattle had never operated segregated public schools, nor
had it ever been subject to court-ordered desegregation. See id. at 712.
112

Id. at 711.

113

Id.

114

Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 711.

115

Id. at 712.

116

Id. Surprisingly, Seattle, with significant populations of Asian (15%), Black (9.9%), Hispanic/
Latino (5.3%), and Native American (1%), chose only to distinguish between “white” and
“nonwhite.” See U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000, available at
http://www.ofm.wa.gov/pop/census2000/profiles/place/1605363000.pdf.

256

Tennessee Journal of Race, Gender, & Social Justice

[Vol. 1

this designation, only students whose race would “serve to bring the school into
balance”117 gained admission until the racial composition was within the guideline
range.
The issues emanating from the Jefferson County, Kentucky
(“Louisville”)118 district were in many ways similar to those from Seattle. The
Louisville district’s twenty-five year court-ordered desegregation plan119 ended in
2000 after the District Court found that the vestiges of the Louisville district’s
prior policy of segregation had been eliminated “[t]o the greatest extent
practicable.”120 Then, in 2001, Louisville adopted a “voluntary” assignment plan,
whereby most of the district’s public schools were required to maintain a
minimum of fifteen percent and a maximum of fifty percent black121 student
enrollment.122
The Louisville plan assigned a student first entering the district’s schools
to a school based either on the proximity of that student’s address to the school or
based on that student’s parental request for a particular school.123 However, if a
student’s race would contribute to “racial imbalance” as defined under the plan, it
denied that student’s assignment and/or preference.124 Initial assignment could
result in an inconvenience ⎯ i.e., if the assigned school was farther away than the
preferred and/or nearest school. Although subsequent transfer between schools
was possible, the district would, as with the initial school assignment deny
transfer requests solely on the basis of the racial guidelines.125,

117

Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 712 (citing Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005)).
118

The city of Louisville composed the majority of the Jefferson County, Kentucky district.

119

See Hampton v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Ed., 72 F. Supp. 2d 753, 762–764 (W.D. Ky. 1999).

120

Hampton v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Ed., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 360 (W.D. Ky. 2000).

121

See supra note 109. The Louisville district classified students only as black or “other.”

122

Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 716.

123

Id.

124

Id.

125

Id. at 717.
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Upon analyzing the facts, the Court126 recognized two qualifying
compelling interests of racial classifications in the school context: remedying the
effects of past intentional discrimination and diversity in higher education.127 The
Court found that neither district could rely on the interest of remedying the effects
of past discrimination.128 Seattle had never operated a segregated public education
system, and Louisville had previously been found to achieve unitary status.129
The Court further held that both plans failed to demonstrate the diversity
interest in higher education established in Grutter,130 which the Court interpreted
as “not focused on race alone but encompass[ing] ‘all factors that may contribute
to student body diversity.’”131 The Court also noted that, “it is not an interest in
simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified percentage of the student body is in
effect guaranteed to be members of selected ethnic groups, that can justify the use
126

The majority in Parents Involved was comprised of Chief Justice Roberts, Justices Scalia,
Thomas, Alito, and Kennedy. However, to the extent the majority held in Section III-B that
“[h]owever closely related race-based assignments may be to achieving racial balance, that itself
cannot be the goal, whether labeled ‘racial diversity’ or anything else,” the Court produced only a
plurality because Justice Kennedy did not join that Section of the opinion. See Parents Involved,
551 U.S. at 733. Additionally, although Justice Thomas wholly concurred in the majority opinion,
he also wrote a concurring opinion in which he lambasted Justice Breyer’s dissent. Id. at 748
(Thomas, J., concurring). In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas wrote:
Disfavoring a colorblind interpretation of the Constitution, [Justice Breyer]
would give school boards a free hand to make decisions on the basis of race—an
approach reminiscent of that advocated by the segregationists in Brown v. Board
of Education. This approach is just as wrong today as it was a half century ago.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
127

See id. at 720–22 (majority opinion). See also Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992)
(recognizing the interest in remedying the effects of past discrimination); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328
(2003) (recognizing the interest in diversity in higher education).
128

See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 720–21.

129

Id.

130

See id. at 722-25. Although the Court framed its analysis in terms of diversity in higher
education, the actual analysis focused merely on the interest in a diverse student body; “higher
education” was mentioned only in passing and did not play a significant role in the Court’s
analysis. See Grutter, 539 U.S. 306.
131

Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 722 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337 (2003)).
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of race.”132 With this framework in mind, the Court examined the Seattle and
Louisville plans and held that they failed the Grutter analysis because, under
those plans, “race is not considered as part of a broader effort to achieve
‘exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints;’ race, for
some students, is determinative standing alone.”133
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, likely to play an important role in the
Court’s upcoming decision in Fisher V, warrants analysis. First, Justice Kennedy
agreed with the majority that “[d]iversity, depending on its meaning and
definition, is a compelling educational goal a school district may pursue.”134
Kennedy concluded that both Seattle and Louisville’s AAE programs failed strict
scrutiny analysis. Kennedy found that Louisville’s AAE program failed because
the district failed to “establish, in detail, how decisions based on an individual
student’s race are made,”135 a threshold requirement for proponents of such
challenged legislation. Although Kennedy never stated that he believed
Louisville’s plan, as operated, to be unconstitutional, he nevertheless found that
the proponents failed to sufficiently establish the plan’s details and “[w]hen a
court subjects governmental action to strict scrutiny, it cannot construe
ambiguities in favor of the State.”136 Kennedy also found that Seattle’s AAE
program failed strict scrutiny, even though the district described in detail the
“methods and criteria used to determine assignment decisions on the basis of
individual racial classifications,” because the district failed to show “its plan to be
narrowly tailored to achieve its own ends.”137
132

Id. (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324–25).

133

Id. at 723 (quoting Grutter, 539, U.S. at 330).

134

Id. at 783 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

135

Id. at 784–85 (“[Louisville] fails to make clear . . . who makes the decisions; what if any
oversight is employed; the precise circumstances in which an assignment decision will or will not
be made . . . or how it is determined which of two similarly situated children will be subjected to a
given race-based decision.”).
136
137

Id. at 786.

See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 786–87(Kennedy, J., concurring). Kennedy took issue with
the fact that under Seattle’s plan, a school with “fifty percent [Asian] students and fifty percent
white students but no [Black], Native American, or Latino students would qualify as balanced,
while a school with thirty percent [Asian], twenty-five percent [Black], twenty-five percent
Latino, and twenty percent white students would not.” Id. at 787.
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Responding to the Section III-B portion of the Court’s opinion,138 which
he found “too dismissive of the legitimate interest government has in ensuring all
people have equal opportunity regardless of their race,” Justice Kennedy stated
that he believed the Constitution does not “require[] schools districts to ignore the
problem of de facto resegregation in schooling.”139 Kennedy found that raceconscious measures are permissible, but those measures cannot “treat[] each
student in a different fashion solely on the basis of . . . race.”140
Kennedy stated that of Justice Breyer’s reliance “on this Court's
precedents to justify the explicit, sweeping, classwide [sic] racial classifications at
issue here is a misreading of our authorities that, it appears to me, tends to
undermine well-accepted principles needed to guard our freedom.”141 In fact,
Kennedy went so far as to say that the dissent’s analysis was so permissive of the
challenged legislation that it “bears more than a passing resemblance to rationalbasis review.”142 Kennedy noted that the dissent’s assertion that it was merely
following stare decisis by relying on the majority opinions of Gratz and Grutter
was “simply baffling.”143 Kennedy found Gratz inapplicable because it involved a
system in which race was not the entire classification, and he found Grutter
unsupportive of the dissent’s position because the system sustained in Grutter,
unlike the Seattle and Louisville systems, was “flexible enough to take into
account ‘all pertinent elements of diversity.’”144
In conclusion, and revealing what will perhaps be the logic behind his
decision in Fisher V, Kennedy stated that, because of the inherent problems in
138

Without Justice Kennedy’s acquiescence, Section III-B is merely a plurality.

139

Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 787–88 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

140

Id. at 789. Kennedy suggested some permissible race-conscious measures, such as “strategic
site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with general recognition of the
demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for special programs; recruiting students and
faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other statistics by race.”
Id.
141

Id. at 790–91.

142

Id. at 791.

143

Id. at 792.

144

Id. at 793 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341).
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defining “race” and who should be a part of a particular classification, the
Constitution allows “the individual, child or adult, [to] find his own identity, [to]
define her own persona, without state intervention that classifies on the basis of
his race or the color of her skin.”145 When analyzed in conjunction with language
found earlier in his concurrence, this statement seems to indicate Justice
Kennedy’s belief that in order for an AAE program to be constitutional, it must
not allow for decisions to be made on an individual basis. Rather, broad, raceconscious decisions that are race-neutral on an individual level are a
constitutionally permissible means to achieving the governmental interest in
diversity.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN EDUCATION
PROGRAMS
Bakke, Gratz, Grutter, and Parents Involved represent the keystones of the
Court’s jurisprudential evolution in AAE cases. Before turning attention to Fisher
V, it is important to recognize the constitutional standards to which an AAE
program will currently be held. First, the appropriate standard of review for such
programs is strict scrutiny.146 This “‘standard of review . . . is not dependent on
the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification.’”147
For an AAE program to survive strict scrutiny, the proponent “must
demonstrate that the use of individual racial classifications . . . is ‘narrowly
tailored’ to achieve a ‘compelling’ government interest.”148 In other words, it
must provide individual consideration of applicants of all races.149 Although a
determination that a challenged program is narrowly tailored necessitates a factintensive, subjective inquiry, “[n]arrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of
every conceivable race-neutral alternative.”150 However, an AAE program is per
145

Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

146

See cases cited supra notes 19–21.

147

Adarand, 515 U.S. 200, 222 (2003) (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 494 (1989) (plurality opinion)).
148

Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 720 (citing Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 (1995)).

149

See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337.

150

Id. at 339; see also, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280, n.6 (1986).
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se invalid if it “insulat[es] each category of applicants with certain desired
qualifications from competition with all other applicants.”151
The presence of a compelling governmental interest is an objective
measure, of which the Court has recognized two. The first interest is in
“remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination;”152 however, it seems
that this interest has limited applicability.153 The second recognized compelling
interest is in diversity; whether or not that interest is limited to higher education
seems unclear after the Court’s decision in Parents Involved.154 This framework
will be essential to accurately predicting the Court’s upcoming decision in Fisher
V.155
V. THE CONTINUUM: FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN
The Supreme Court remained silent on AAE cases for the five years
following Parents Involved until February 21, 2012, when the Court granted
certiorari in Fisher V.156 At the time of this writing, the Supreme Court has not yet
heard oral arguments in Fisher V. Therefore, to provide the ideological support
for how each side of a likely divided Court will decide the case, both the Fifth
Circuit’s panel decision157 – which upheld Texas’ admissions policy – and the
dissenting opinion from Fisher’s petition for rehearing158 – which concluded that
the program is unconstitutional – will be analyzed.

151

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315 (1978).

152

Parents Involved, 55 U.S. at 702 (citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992)).

153

The Court in Parents Involved invalidated Seattle’s AAE program in part because that district
had never operated a segregated public education system. See id. at 702–03.
154

Compare Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 (recognizing the diversity interest in higher education), with
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 722–25 (recognizing the diversity interest in higher education, but
conducing the analysis with only a general interest in diversity).
155

See infra Part VI.

156

631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (mem.) (2012).

157

Fisher III, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011).

158

Fisher IV, 644 F.3d 301 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (Jones, J., dissenting) (per curiam), aff’g 631 F.3d
213 (5th Cir. 2011).
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In Fisher V, as in Gratz, the two petitioners, Abigail Fisher and Rachel
Michalewicz, are both Caucasian.159 The University of Texas at Austin (“Texas”)
denied both petitioners’ summer and fall admission into the 2008 freshman class
at.160 The petitioners originally sought a preliminary injunction requiring Texas to
re-evaluate their applications for admission without considering their race and
grant them admission if the re-evaluation produced a different result, but their
request was ultimately denied.161
A. Texas’s Admissions Program
Texas’s admissions process has two major components. The primary
component is the “Top Ten Percent Law,”162 which guarantees Texas high school
students graduating in the top ten percent of their class admission into any state
university.163 The second facet of Texas’s program—which applies to all
applicants not admitted under the Top Ten Percent Law—is known as the
“AI/PAI Plan,” which is itself composed of two scores: an Academic Index
(“AI”) and a Personal Achievement Index (“PAI”).164
The AI is an objective score based on an applicant’s class rank,
standardized test scores, and high school curriculum.165 The PAI is a subjective
score that is itself comprised of three separate scores: two applicant essays
submitted by the applicant,166 and a completely subjective assessment of the
applicant’s “demonstrated leadership qualities, extracurricular activities, honors
and awards, work experience, community service, and special …

159

Fisher v. Texas (“Fisher I”), 556 F. Supp. 2d 603, 605 (W.D. Tex. 2008).

160

Id. at 605.

161

Id. at 605, 610.

162

1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 155 (West).

163

Fisher I, 556 F. Supp. 2d at 605.

164

Id.

165

Id.

166

Although characterized as subjective, the essay readers scored within one point of each other
91% of the time. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (“Fisher II”), 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 597
(W.D. Tex. 2009).
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circumstances.”167 “Special circumstances” refer to “the socioeconomic status of
the family and the [applicant’s] school, a single-parent home, whether languages
other than English are spoken at home, family responsibilities, and race.”168
Texas’s program organizes the applicants’ calculated AI/PAI scores into a
selection matrix.169 The program then allocates the applicants according to their
major preferences, “although in reality there is little availability in most majors
other than Liberal Arts after application of the Top [Ten] Percent Law.”170 The
program considers applicants for their first choice of major and then, if not
admitted, considers them for their second choice of major. If still not admitted, an
applicant is then designated an undeclared liberal arts major.171
The issue in Fisher V arises from the application of the AI/PAI component
to an applicant pool that has already shaped by the Top Ten Percent Law. The
Texas legislature enacted the Top Ten Percent Law to promote diversity,172 and
has proven its success, boasting one of the country’s most racially diverse public
university systems.173 The question that emerges then, is whether Texas’s
consideration of the race of applicants who do not benefit from the Top Ten
Percent Law is a permissible attempt to balance the racial composition of the
student body with that of the state.

167

Fisher I, 556 F. Supp. 2d at 606 (emphasis added).

168

Id. (emphasis added).

169

Id.

170

Id.

171

Id.

172

See infra note 189.
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Id. From 1998 to 2007, the number of Hispanic undergraduates rose by 29.3% and the number
of African-American undergraduates rose by 32.4%. See Lisa Sandberg, Top 10 Rule Limits UTAustin, Says School President, HOUSTON CHRONICLE (Mar. 20, 2008),
http://www.chron.com/business/article/Top-10-rule-limits-UT-Austin-says-school-1791006.php.
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B. The District Court’s Decision
At trial in the Western District Court of Texas,174 the petitioners’ primary
charge175 against Texas’s program was its failure to advance a compelling state
interest:
[Texas’s] diversity goals are ‘open-ended[,]’[] or, in other words,
because [Texas] has made no effort to define a percentage of its
student body that must be filled by underrepresented minorities in
order to achieve critical mass that therefore [Texas’s] use of race is
not tied to the educational benefits of a diverse student body.
Rather, . . . it reflects a pursuit of racial balancing that reflects [the
state of] Texas’ racial demographics.”176
The court rejected the petitioners’ argument, reasoning that Grutter
specifically prohibited Texas from implementing an invalid use of racial
balancing or quotas by mandating a specific percentage of its student body be
comprised of racial minorities.177 In summation of the compelling interest
arguments, the court held that critical mass178 is not a “magic number”: it has
never been defined as a specific percentage, and is instead defined by the
educational benefits that diversity provides.179

174

Fisher II, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587.

175

Among the petitioners’ other arguments were that Texas lacks a compelling interest “because it
has already achieved or exceeded ‘critical mass’ through its race-neutral policies, most notably the
Top Ten Percent [L]aw.” Id. at 603. In support of their proposition, the petitioners presented
several weak arguments in an attempt to establish “critical mass” at twenty percent. See id. at 604–
05. After a thinly veiled implication that the petitioners intentionally presented misleading
support, the court held that the mere fact that minority enrollment at Texas exceeds twenty percent
“does not mean [that Texas] lacks a compelling … interest.” Id. at 605.
176

Id. at 590 (internal quotation marks omitted).

177

Id. at 604.

178

AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 432 (4th ed. 2000) “Critical mass” is defined as “an amount
of level needed for a specific result or action to occur.” In the context used above, the desired
result was achieving educational benefits as the result of increased diversity.
179

See id. at 607.
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The petitioners also argued that Texas’s program was not narrowly
tailored180 for several reasons, most convincingly of which, was the lack of a
“logical end point.”181 However, while the Grutter Court required that “raceconscious admissions policies must be limited in time,” it also recognized that
“[i]n the context of higher education, the durational requirement can be met by . .
. periodic reviews to determine whether racial preferences are still necessary to
achieve student body diversity.”182 The district court accepted that Texas’s
inclusion of an evaluation of the program every five years was sufficient to satisfy
the Grutter standard.183 The district court held, in conclusion, that “as long as
Grutter remains good law, [Texas’s] current admissions program remains
constitutional.”184
C. Constitutional: The Fifth Circuit’s Affirmation
The petitioners appealed to the Fifth Circuit in Fisher III.185 The court’s
panel opinion186 stated very early that “[t]he ever-increasing number of minorities
gaining admission under this Top Ten Percent Law casts a shadow on the horizon
to the otherwise-plain legality of the Grutter-like admissions program.”187
Nonetheless, the court affirmed the constitutionality of Texas’s program.188
180

See id. at 609–12. Three of the petitioners’ four arguments were weak and quickly rejected by
the court.
181

Id. at 612 (internal citation omitted).

182

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342.

183

Fisher II, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 612.

184

Id. at 613.

185

Fisher III, 631 F.3d 213, 216–17 (5th Cir. 2011).

186

It seems the respondents were very lucky regarding the Fifth Circuit’s decision. Judge King,
one of the three judges on the panel, intimated in a special concurrence that he might have reached
different conclusions had the court been fully briefed on the Top Ten Percent Law and its effect on
racial diversity. Id. at 247 (King, J, concurring). Judge Emilio Garza, one of the panel’s other
members also wrote a special concurrence, which stated “I concur in the majority opinion because,
despite my belief that Grutter represents a digression in the course of constitutional law, today's
opinion is a faithful, if unfortunate, application of that misstep.” Id. (Garza, J., concurring).
187

Fisher III, 631 F.3d at 216–17.

188

Id. at 217.
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The petitioners’ largely repeated their lower court arguments before the
Fifth Circuit. First, petitioners argued that Texas’s plan goes beyond diversity for
education’s sake and instead pursues a racial composition that mirrors that of the
state as a whole, which is unconstitutional “racial balancing.”189 The petitioners
point to Texas’s reference to “state population data to justify the adoption of raceconscious admissions measures” as evidence of its true motive of “outright racial
balancing.”190 The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument, finding that Texas “gave
appropriate attention to those educational benefits [of diversity] identified in
Grutter without overstepping any constitutional bounds.”191
The petitioners next contended that Texas’s incorporation of raceconscious programs did not give adequate consideration to “race-neutral”
alternatives it had already implemented through the Top Ten Percent Law.192 The
court evaluated that system in context of the Grutter-affirmed goal of diversity,
noting that “[w]hile the [Top Ten Percent Law] may have contributed to an
increase in overall minority enrollment, those minority students remain clustered
in certain programs, limiting the beneficial effects of educational diversity”; the
holistic review endorsed in Grutter better addressed those imbalances.193
The petitioners’ last argument was that Texas’s minority enrollment under
the combined Top Ten Percent Law and race-conscious programs surpassed a
“critical mass,” and that the additional, minimal “increase in diversity achieved
through [administration of a] Grutter-like policy does not justify its use of race-

189

Id. at 234.

190

Id. at 236. In 1996, the Fifth Circuit struck down the use of a race-conscious admissions policy
at the University of Texas’ law school. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (1996). In 1997, the Texas
legislature responded to Hopwood by enacting the Top Ten Percent Law, under which the number
of minorities enrolled at Texas steadily increased. For example, in 1997, the Black and Hispanic
enrollment at Texas was 2.7% and 12.6%, respectively. By 2004, Black enrollment rose to 4.5%
and Hispanic enrollment rose to 16.9%. Fisher III, 631 F.3d at 224. Despite these positive gains
and by relying on Grutter, Texas adopted a policy to include race as one of the factors it considers
in admissions beginning in 2005. Id. at 226.
191

Fisher III, 631 F.3d at 236.

192

Id. at 234; see also supra note 173.

193

See Fisher III, 631 F.3d at 240.
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conscious measures.”194 The court maintained, however, that “critical mass” is a
determination properly left to Texas’s administrators, and that “Grutter pointedly
refused to tie the concept of ‘critical mass’ to any fixed number.”195
However, the court seemingly left the door open for the argument to be
raised again in the future:
None of this is to say that Grutter left “critical mass” without
objective meaning. Rather, the legally cognizable interest—
attaining a critical mass of underrepresented minority students—
“is defined by reference to the educational benefits that diversity is
designed to produce.” If a plaintiff produces evidence that calls
into question a university's good faith pursuit of those educational
benefits, its race-conscious admissions policies may be found
unconstitutional.196
Moreover, the court added that “[Texas’s] claim that it has not yet achieved
critical mass is less convincing when viewed against the backdrop of the Top Ten
Percent Law, which had already driven aggregate minority enrollment up to more
than one-fifth of the University's incoming freshman class.”197
The court also rejected the petitioners’ alternate argument that even if
Texas had not yet achieved critical mass, “it had come close enough that the
reintroduction of race-conscious measures was unwarranted.”198 Relying on
Parents Involved, the petitioners argued that the “minimal effect,” of Texas’s
race-conscious measures rendered them invalid.199 The Fifth Circuit believed,
194

Id. at 234.

195

See id at 243–44.

196

Id. at 245 (internal citations omitted).

197

Id.

198

Id. at 246.

199

Fisher III, 631 F.3d at 246. The district court thought this argument was an attempt “to force
[Texas] into an impossible catch–22: on the one hand, it is well-established that to be narrowly
tailored the means ‘must be specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish’ the compelling
interest, but on the other hand, according to [petitioners], the ‘narrowly tailored’ plan must have
more than a minimal effect.” Fisher II, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 609 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (internal
citation omitted).
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however, that the Parents Involved Court referred to the challenged policies’
“minimal effect” merely “as evidence that other, more narrowly tailored means
would be effective to serve the school districts’ interests.”200 Perhaps most
relevant to this Article’s purpose, the court stated that “Justice Kennedy—who
provided the fifth vote in Parents Involved—wrote separately to clarify that ‘a
more nuanced, individual evaluation . . . informed by Grutter’ would be
permissible, even for the small gains sought by the school districts.”201
D. Unconstitutional: The En Banc Dissent
After the Fifth Circuit’s panel affirmed the District Court’s judgment,
Fisher and Michalewicz petitioned for rehearing en banc; with a narrow 9–7
majority, the Fifth Circuit denied the petition in Fisher IV.202 In an uncommon
move, five of the seven judges who voted to rehear the case wrote a lengthy
dissent, which clearly expressed several reasons why they felt the challenged
program was unconstitutional.203
The dissent believed that the panel in Fisher III misapplied the strict
scrutiny standard of review and “supplant[ed] strict scrutiny with total deference
to [Texas’s] administrators.”204 More importantly ⎯ and indicative of what will
likely be the crux of Fisher V ⎯ the dissent questioned “whether a race-conscious
admissions policy adopted [in conjunction with the Top Ten Percent Law] is
narrowly tailored to achieve [Texas’s] goal of increasing ‘diversity.’”205 The
dissent concluded that the plan upheld in Grutter was distinguishable from
Texas’s plan; in Grutter, “the consideration of race was viewed as indispensable
in more than tripling minority representation at [Michigan Law].”206 Under
Texas’s plan, however:
200

Fisher III, 631 F.3d at 246.

201

Id. (quoting Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 790
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
202

644 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (per curiam), aff’g 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011).

203

See id. at 303–08 (Jones, C.J., dissenting).

204

Id. at 305.

205

Id. at 306–07.

206

Id. at 307 (quoting Parent Involved, 551 U.S. at 704).

2012]

CONDORCET DEFEATED

269

The additional diversity contribution of the [Texas’s] raceconscious admissions program is tiny, and far from
“indispensable.” It is one thing for the panel to accept “diversity”
and achieving a “critical mass” of preferred minority students as
acceptable University goals. It is quite another to approve
gratuitous racial preferences when a race-neutral policy has
resulted in over one-fifth of University entrants being African–
American or Hispanic.207
VI. PREDICTING THE OUTCOME
There are a number of dynamics that will influence the Supreme Court’s
ultimate decision on the fate of Texas’s AAE program. Will one of the Court’s
conservative Justices go rogue, citing stare decisis? Will one of the Court’s liberal
Justices break rank and find that the Equal Protection Clause “creep” has gone too
far? How will the Court’s newest Justices rule? If the Court reverses Fisher III,
will it merely find that Texas’s AAE program is unconstitutional, or will it go
further and reverse Grutter? In what direction will Justice Kennedy’s swing vote
turn? This Part will evaluate past opinions and political concerns that have the
potential to influence the future of AAE programs.
A. The “‘Unconstitutional’ Bloc”
Based on their holdings in previous AAE cases, four Justices will, in all
likelihood, vote to reverse Fisher III and find Texas’s AAE program
unconstitutional: Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas. Of
these four, three will also likely opine that Grutter should be reversed altogether.
The probable conclusions of each will henceforth be addressed in turn, according
to the likelihood that they will reverse the Fifth Circuit’s decision.
The Justices most likely to vote to reverse both Fisher III and Grutter are
Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia.208 Justice Thomas has a long

207
208

Id. at 307.

Thomas and Scalia vote together in 92% of cases, the highest ratio among the Court.
SCOTUSblog Final Stats 0t09-7.7.10, SCOTUSBLOG (July 7, 2010),
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Final-Charts-070710-JA.pdf.
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history of ardently opposing AAE programs.209 For example, in Grutter, Justice
Thomas wrote a separate opinion in which he stated his belief that AAE programs
violate the Equal Protection Clause.210 Justice Scalia will also likely vote to
reverse both Fisher III and Grutter. In Grutter, Justice Scalia wrote a separate
opinion in which he stated, “[Michigan Law’s] mystical “critical mass”
justification for its discrimination by race challenges even the most gullible mind.
The admissions statistics show it to be a sham to cover a scheme of racially
proportionate admissions.”211 Moreover, Justice Scalia believed that the
“educational benefit” of “cross-racial understanding” is not an “educational
benefit” at all.212 He reasoned:
[I]t is a lesson of life rather than law-essentially the same lesson
taught to (or rather learned by, for it cannot be “taught” in the
usual sense) people three feet shorter and 20 years younger than
the full-grown adults at the University of Michigan Law School, in
institutions ranging from Boy Scout troops to public-school
kindergartens. If properly considered an “educational benefit” at
all, it is surely not one that is either uniquely relevant to law school
or uniquely “teachable” in a formal educational setting.213
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, although recent additions to the
Court, are anticipated to vote to reverse Fisher III, and the Chief Justice will also
likely find that Grutter should be reversed. Roberts and Alito were both in the
Parents Involved majority. Roberts’ general disdain for race-based classifications
manifests itself in his majority opinion for the Parents Involved case which boldly
states: “The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop

209

See, e.g., Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 748 (Thomas, J., concurring) (holding that “state
entities may not experiment with race-based means to achieve ends they deem socially desirable”);
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 281 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring) (holding that “a State's use of racial
discrimination in higher education admissions is categorically prohibited by the Equal Protection
Clause”).
210

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 351 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).

211

Id. at 346–47 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

212

Id. at 347-48.

213

Id. at 347.
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discriminating on the basis of race.”214 However, it is worth noting that in the
past, Roberts has at times been willing to vote in a manner inconsistent with what
might be expected of him in a politically-charged matter.215 Justice Alito,
although likely to reverse Fisher III, will probably not go as far as to reverse
Grutter; Alito has previously espoused his respect for the doctrine of stare
decisis.216
B. The “Affirmation Alliance”
There are two Justices that will almost undoubtedly vote to affirm Fisher
III. Justices Breyer and Ginsburg each have a long history of supporting AAE
programs.217 Furthermore, each has also supported an AAE program that no
reasonable mind could find is as narrowly tailored as the one at issue in Fisher
V.218
Justice Ginsburg will almost certainly vote to affirm Fisher III. In Gratz,
Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion in which she gave AAE programs
wide latitude by stating that “government decision makers may properly
distinguish between policies of exclusion and inclusion.”219 Justice Ginsburg went
on to say “the Constitution is color conscious to prevent discrimination being
214

Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 748.

215

See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012). Roberts shocked pundits by
upholding the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.
216

See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr., To Be An Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 318-19 (2006) (statement of Judge Samuel Alito). During his confirmation hearings,
Alito stated in response to a question regarding stare decisis from Chairman Arlen Specter that,
“in every case in which there is a prior precedent, the first issue is the issue of stare decisis, and
the presumption is that the Court will follow its prior precedents. There needs to be a special
justification for overruling a prior precedent.” Id. at 319.
217

Compare Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701, 803 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting), and Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 298 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), with Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306, 344-46 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
218

See generally Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). In Grutter, both Breyer and Ginsburg upheld
Michigan’s admissions policy, which used race as a predominant factor.
219

Gratz, 539 U.S. at 301 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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perpetuated and to undo the effects of past discrimination.” 220 Moreover, Justice
Ginsburg joined Justice Breyer’s dissent in Parents Involved.221
Justice Breyer, also, will likely affirm Fisher III. Justice Breyer wrote a
voluminous dissent in Parents Involved, which asserted that the law has
“consistently and unequivocally approved of . . . race-conscious measures to
combat segregated schools. The Equal Protection Clause . . . has always
distinguished in practice between state action that excludes and thereby
subordinates racial minorities and state action that seeks to bring together people
of all races.”222 Justice Breyer also joined the majority and Justice Ginsburg’s
concurrence in Grutter.223
C. The New Justices’ Association
Since its decision in Parents Involved, the Supreme Court has welcomed
two new members. On August 6, 2009, Sonia Sotomayor was confirmed to the
Court to replace Justice Souter, and on August 5, 2010, Elena Kagan was
confirmed to replace Justice Stevens.224 Although neither has participated in a
Supreme Court case on point, one can draw insight into their potential
conclusions from a variety of sources.
It is exceedingly likely that Justice Sotomayor will affirm Fisher III;225 the
clearest evidence comes from the fact that Justice Sotomayor has voted with both

220

Id. at 302 (citing United States v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 372 F.2d 836, 876 (5th Cir.
1966)).
221

Parents Involved, 551 U.S.at 803 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

222

Id. at 864.

223

Grutter, 539 U.S. 306.

224

S. 9063, 111th Cong. § 82 (2009); S. 6991, 111th Cong. § 140 (2010).

225

Although the author finds little relevance in the following, Justice Sotomayor was heavily
criticized during her confirmation hearings because of some past comments she made regarding
race. The most publicized of these comments occurred during a 2001 lecture at Boalt Hall, during
which Sotomayor said “I would hope that a wise Latina woman with the richness of her
experiences would more often than not reach a better conclusion than a white male who hasn't
lived that life.” Symposium, Raising the Bar: Latino and Latina Presence in the Judiciary and the
Struggle for Representation, 13 LA RAZA L.J. 1 (2002).
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Justices Ginsburg and Breyer in ninety percent of the Court’s decisions.226 The
most notable affirmative-action-related case in which Justice Sotomayor
participated prior to joining the Court was Ricci v. DeStafano.227 In this Second
Circuit panel decision eventually reversed by the Supreme Court, Justice
Sotomayor voted to allow the City of New Haven to discard the results of a test it
had given to firefighters because the City believed the test had a disparate impact
on minority firefighters.228 Justice Sotomayor’s ruling indicates that she finds
affirmative action programs generally constitutional.
Justice Kagan recused herself from Fisher V. Although she did not
announce her motive for doing so, many speculate that it was her tenure as
Solicitor General during the time the Justice Department filed an amicus brief in
the Fifth Circuit in support of Texas’s program—the same program that will be
before the Court in Fisher V.229 Kagan’s recusal is important for two reasons.
First, because she is the former dean of Harvard Law School, she is likely the
only member of the Court with practical experience regarding the use of
affirmative action admissions policies. Second, because one could reasonably
assume that she would be inclined to uphold Texas’s policy, the prospect of that
program being upheld is even more tenuous.
D. The Kennedy Swing
A scholarly survey of the past twenty years of Supreme Court
jurisprudence would point to Justice Kennedy as the traditional “swing vote.”
However, given his nuanced views in the Court’s previous AAE cases, predicting
Kennedy’s vote is not as difficult as scholars might believe. Justice Kennedy’s
dissent in Grutter provides a clear roadmap for his likely vote in Fisher V.

226

SCOTUSblog Final Stats 0t09-7.7.10, SCOTUSBLOG (July 7, 2010),
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Final-Charts-070710-JA.pdf.
227

264 F. App’x 106 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d, 557 U.S. 557 (2009).

228

Id.

229

See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees, Fisher v. University of
Texas at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-50822), 2010 WL 2624787. As Solicitor
General, Kagan’s approval was necessary for the brief to be filed.
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In his Grutter dissent, Justice Kennedy agreed with the majority that the
proper rule by which to analyze AAE programs comes from Bakke in which one
of the Court’s holdings was that promoting racial diversity was a compelling
governmental interest that can justify an AAE program, so long as it is narrowly
tailored.230 His deviation from the Grutter majority centered on Michigan Law’s
failure to narrowly tailor the AAE program, given the attention paid to the “daily
reports,” which provided constant updates on the number of accepted minority
applicants.231
Given the fact-intensive nature of Fisher V, Kennedy will likely find that
Texas’s holistic review, which includes an applicant’s race,232 is valid. Justice
Kennedy’s primary concern for constitutionality seems to be giving each
applicant an individual review, within the institution’s discretion, that takes into
account all of the many ways the applicant can contribute to the school’s
diversity.233
However, Justice Kennedy may find that when used in conjunction with
the Top Ten Percent Law, the subsequent consideration of race is invalid. There is
solid factual support that Top Ten Percent Law was increasing the diversity of
Texas.234 The Top Ten Percent Law increased Texas’s diversity by relying on the
state’s de facto racial segregation. In other words, if the state’s racial
demographics were homogenous throughout its territory, the law probably would
not have made the same advances in Texas’s racial diversity. Based on those
facts, Justice Kennedy could find that, because of the de facto racial segregation
230

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
[A] university admissions program may take account of race . . . [if] the program
can meet the test of strict scrutiny by the judiciary. This is a unitary formulation.
If strict scrutiny is abandoned or manipulated . . . , the Court lacks authority to
approve the use of race . . . [and] undermines both the test and its own
controlling precedents.

Id. See Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
231

Id. at 392 (“The daily consideration of racial breakdown of admitted students is not a feature of
affirmative-action programs used by other institutions of higher learning.”).
232

See Fisher I, 556 F. Supp. 2d 603, 606 (W.D. Tex. 2008).

233

See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

234

See supra note 173.
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in the state and its corresponding effect on high school demographics, the Top
Ten Percent Law functions perfectly as a race-neutral means by which Texas
increased enrollment of underrepresented minorities.
VII. CONCLUSION
A tabulation of the most plausible outcome of the Justices’ votes in Fisher
V would produce a 5–3 opinion, written by Justice Kennedy,235 invalidating
Texas’s program because of the contemporaneous statutory requirements of the
Top Ten Percent Law. Justice Kennedy’s opinion will, however, reaffirm that the
AAE program advocated in Grutter—narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
interest—remains valid. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Scalia, and
Alito will join in the portion of Kennedy’s opinion regarding the invalidity of
Texas’s AAE program and join in a separate opinion holding that race-conscious
admissions programs are never valid.236
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor will almost certainly dissent.
Whether these three Justices rely on stare decisis or their genuine beliefs, they
will find that Texas’s program is in conformity with the type of program
recognized as permissible in Grutter. Therefore, these three Justices will vote to
affirm Fisher III and will thereby recognize the continuing validity of Grutter.
The most likely result of Fisher V is that Texas’s program will be found
invalid, but that the overall validity of AAE programs will be upheld.237
Ultimately, it is unlikely that the Court’s opinion in Fisher V will have a dramatic
effect on AAE programs; if a particular program is modeled after the Michigan
program, then its continued use will be valid. Finally, even if the Court holds that
any consideration of race in admissions decisions is invalid, a university’s race235

Chief Justice Roberts will likely assign the opinion to Kennedy to avoid losing him during
circulation of the draft opinions.
236

That opinion will not receive a majority of votes and will therefore have scant precedential
value.
237

The author’s final prediction is as follows: five Justices (Kennedy, Alito, Thomas, Roberts, and
Scalia) will find Texas’ program invalid; four Justices (Alito, Thomas, Roberts, and Scalia) will
concur in part and dissent in part, finding AAE programs unconstitutional; three Justices (Breyer,
Ginsburg, and Sotomayor) will dissent, finding both that Texas’ program is valid and that AAE
programs are constitutional.
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neutral consideration of socio-economic factors will perpetuate the current status
quo due to the correlation between race and economics throughout large areas in
the United States.

